Abstract-This paper investigates a wireless powered sensor network, where multiple sensor nodes are deployed to monitor a certain external environment. A multiantenna power station (PS) provides the power to these sensor nodes during wireless energy transfer phase, and consequently the sensor nodes employ the harvested energy to transmit their own monitoring information to a fusion center during wireless information transfer (WIT) phase. The goal is to maximize the system sum throughput of the sensor network, where two different scenarios are considered, i.e., PS and the sensor nodes belong to the same or different service operator(s). For the first scenario, we propose a global optimal solution to jointly design the energy beamforming and time allocation. We further develop a closed-form solution for the proposed sum throughput maximization. For the second scenario in which the PS and the sensor nodes belong to different service operators, energy incentives are required for the PS to assist the sensor network. Specifically, the sensor network needs to pay in order to purchase the energy services released from the PS to support WIT. In this case, this paper exploits this hierarchical energy interaction, which is known as energy trading. We propose a quadratic energy trading-based Stackelberg game, linear energy trading-based Stackelberg game, and social welfare scheme, in which we derive the Stackelberg equilibrium for the formulated games, and the optimal solution for the social welfare scheme. Finally, numerical results are provided to validate the performance of our proposed schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
N RECENT years, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been considered as one of the thriving technologies with the advance of Internet of Things (IoT) [1] . WSNs have wide range of applications, from environment monitoring, i.e., pollution prevention, precision agriculture, structures and buildings health, to event detection, i.e., intrusions, fire/flood emergencies, and target tracking, i.e., surveillance [2] . A WSN is composed of a large number of sensor nodes for data monitoring and a fusion center (FC) to process the data sent from these sensor nodes. Traditionally, batteries or other embedded energy sources are fixed to provide energy for these sensor nodes in WSNs [3] . The short battery life limits their potential applications in practice. Although the battery lifetime can be extended by periodically replacing or recharging the batteries, it may be difficult, costly, dangerous, or even impossible in many applications due to the fact that the sensors can be located inside toxic environments, building structures, or human bodies [4] . Although there have been many efforts in power management policies, the sensor nodes' lifetime still remains a performance bottleneck and makes the wide-range deployment of WSNs challenging.
In order to address the energy-constrained issue, radio frequency (RF) energy harvesting (EH) as one of the promising techniques, has received much attention, since it can provide unlimited power to the sensor nodes which scavenge energy from the environment (i.e., solar, wind, etc.) [5] , [6] . Among these, RF energy radiated by ambient transmitters is almost ubiquitous [7] , which can be harvested more effectively from wireless RF signals. Since RF signal can carry energy and information simultaneously, EH and simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) [8] - [10] is becoming a more and more promising research direction.
With recent advance of RF EH and SWIPT, wireless powered communication networks (WPCNs) has become a new wireless networking technology, where wireless devices can be remotely powered by RF wireless energy transfer (WET) [7] , [11] . Devices in a WPCN are charged by a dedicated wireless energy source [7] , [11] . In addition, the energy released by the energy source is adjustable to satisfy different physical conditions and service criterion [7] , [12] . With the development of WPCNs, a well-known protocol "harvest-then-transmit" was proposed in [13] , where wireless users harvest energy from the RF signals broadcasted by a hybrid access-point (AP) in the downlink (DL). They further use the harvested energy to send their own information to the AP in uplink (UL). Recently, a dedicated WET network was proposed to deploy multiple power stations (PSs) near wireless information transfer (WIT) network, where these PSs provide wireless energy services to user terminals via RF signals [14] , [15] . In [16] , wireless powered relays have been investigated in full-duplex (FD) two-way communication to utilize the harvested energy from the APs and self-interference to transmit information signal. Compared to SWIPT networks, WPCNs have a lower implementation cost since implementing WET networks is rather simple. Thus it is feasible to deploy PSs densely to ensure a good coverage without the need for backhaul links [17] .
One of the potential applications of WPCN is the RF identification (RFID) system that usually consists of a reader and many tags [11] . Specifically, a reader provides the RF energy to the energy-constrained tags, and the tags transmit their identification data to the reader via one-hop backscatter communication using the harvested RF energy. Backscatter communication is to efficiently reduce the power consumption. However, this type of RFID system is restricted to the short-range communications only. With the advances of ultralow-power electronics and RF EH technologies, it is feasible to envisage more sophisticated RFID-like devices that are able to not only harvest RF energy, but also conduct sensing, processing and active communication [18] .
In order to circumvent the energy-constrained issue of WSNs, wireless-powered WSNs is considered in the recent work [19] - [21] . In [19] , multiantenna wireless powered sensor network (WPSN) is investigated, in which a PS transfers electric energy to a sensor node via an electromagnetic wave, and a real-life multiantenna WPSN testbed was built to conduct extensive experiments. The work in [20] proposed the power allocation and beam selection for distributed estimation in wireless passive sensor networks, where the sensors are charged by RF energy sources. Mai et al. [21] studied power allocation for distributed estimation in WSNs with a multipleantenna FC and an unknown scalar random source, in which the sensor nodes are equipped with RF-based EH technology. Observation from sensor nodes is locally processed by using an uncoded amplify-and-forward scheme. The processed signals are sent to the FC and are coherently combined at the FC, where the best linear unbiased estimator is adopted for reliable estimation [21] . To incorporate this imperfect CSI, the robust design is considered in existing channel uncertainty model [22] , where the authors investigated the physical layer security problem in relay WSNs with SWIPT by incorporating a spherical channel uncertainty model.
The deployment of a dedicated WET network in the existing WIT network was investigated in [14] , where the updated network provides both wireless access and energy services. By considering quality-of-service constraints on data links, a tradeoff between the densities of base stations and that of PSs was quantified by modeling the network using stochastic geometry theory [14] . Note that it is assumed in [14] that the WET network is deployed by the same service provider as the existing network. However, in practice, WET and WIT networks can be deployed by different service providers. 1 In such situations, energy incentives (e.g., monetary payments) are needed for the WET network to provide wireless charging services to the WIT network. Here, we call the demand and provision of the energy services as energy trading between WET and WIT networks. To the best of our knowledge, there have been no published works that model and investigate this hierarchical energy interaction in WPSN. This knowledge gap has motivated our research in this paper.
In this paper, we consider a WPSN that consists of a multiantenna PS belonging to the WET network, multiple wireless sensor nodes and an FC belonging to the WIT network. Based on this system model, major contributions of this paper are highlighted in the following.
1) Cooperation-Based Sum Throughput Optimization:
First, we consider an ideal case in which both PS and the sensor network belong to the same service provider. The PS and the sensor network work together to maximize the mutual benefits and to formulate the sum throughput maximization (STM) problem that jointly optimizes the time allocation and energy beamforming.
2) Energy Trading/Social Welfare-Based Sum Throughput
Optimization: We further consider a more practical and challenging scenario in which the PS and the sensor network belong to difference service providers. In this case, the hierarchical energy interaction (i.e., energy trading) between PS and the sensor network is exploited, where the energy incentives (i.e., monetary payments) are charged to the sensor network to purchase the energy services released from the PS. a) We first consider the wireless charging model as a quadratic energy trading process to facilitate the derivation of the optimal power allocation policies for the PS and the sensor network. Specifically, we take into account strategic behaviors of the PS and the sensor network and formulate this energy trading process as a Stackelberg game. b) As comparison, we further develop a linear energy trading-based Stackelberg game, which adopts a linear energy cost model to exploit the hierarchical energy interaction between the PS and the sensor networks. We formulate this energy interaction as a Stackelberg game for a fixed energy transfer time allocation. We derive the Stackelberg equilibrium for the formulated game, where both optimal energy transfer price and the PS transmit power can be achieved by a closed-form solution. c) We further formulate a social welfare optimization scheme in order to exploit the performance loss with the selfish behaviors in PS in energy trading-based Stackelberg games. In this case, both PS and the sensor network cooperatively maximize a social welfare, i.e., the difference between the benefits obtained from the sum throughput at the sensor network and the energy transfer operation cost of the PS. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model. Section III solves the STM problem for the WPSN, whereas the game theory-based WPSN is investigated in Section IV. Section V provides simulation results to validate the theoretical derivations. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
Notations: We use upper case boldface letters for matrices and lower case boldface letters for vectors. (·) T and (·) H denote the transpose and conjugate transpose, respectively. Tr(·) and E{·} stand for trace of a matrix and the statistical expectation for random variables, respectively. λ max (A) represents the maximum eigenvalue of A, whereas v max (A) denotes the eigenvector associated with the maximum eigenvalue of A. A 0 indicates that A is a positive semidefinite matrix. [x] + = max(x, 0). Finally, |·| and · represent the magnitude and Euclidean norm, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a WPSN, shown in Fig. 1 , that consists of one PS 2 equipped with N T transmit antennas, K single-antenna sensor nodes U k , ∀k = 1, . . . , K, and a single-antenna FC. The sensor nodes monitor the surrounding environments, e.g., temperature, pressure, humidity, or even emergency scenarios, and send their own monitoring data to the FC. It is assumed that all sensor nodes are only powered by harvested ambient RF energy provided by the PS and a harvested-then-transmit protocol is adopted in these sensor nodes. The PS first provides energy to those single-antenna sensor nodes. Then those sensor nodes employ harvest-then-transmit protocol to send their own information based on time division multiple access scheme to the single-antenna FC, which collects the monitoring data of the sensor nodes. It is assumed that the whole operation time period is T. During the DL transmission duration θ 0 T, θ 0 ∈ (0, 1), the PS employs an energy beamforming to broadcasts the wireless RF power to K sensor nodes. Further, during the UL duration, each sensor node U k uses the harvested RF energy to send its own monitoring information in θ k T, θ k ∈ [0, 1), to the FC one by one. 3 Without loss of generality, it is assumed that T = 1 and thus we interchangeably use power and energy throughout this paper. Hence, the total time constraint can be written as K k=0 θ k = 1. Let g k ∈ C N T be the channel coefficients between the PS and the U k while h k ∈ C be the channel coefficient between the FC and the U k . Let w ∈ C N T ( w 2 = 1) be the normalized energy beamforming vector sent by the PS, the harvested energy at U k is
where P B is the maximum transmit power available at the PS and ξ k denotes the EH efficiency at U k , for all k. Since all the harvested RF energy is used for the information transmission at sensor nodes, the transmit power p k within θ k time period can be written as
Hence, the achievable throughput of sensor node U k can be expressed as
and σ 2 k denotes the variance of a zero mean circularly symmetric complex Gaussian noise at sensor node U k . Note that in this paper, it is assumed that each sensor node (i.e., U k , ∀k) consumes all the harvested energy during θ 0 time period to transmit its own information signal to the FC during its time allocation θ k .
III. COOPERATIVE SUM THROUGHPUT OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we consider an ideal scenario where both PS and sensor nodes belong to the same service operator. Hence, they can cooperatively work to maximize their common benefits, i.e., system sum throughput. In the following, we propose a global optimal solution with a low complexity to jointly design the energy beamforming vector w and time allocation duration θ .
A. Global Optimal Solution
In this section, we formulate the STM problem with semidefinite programming relaxation (i.e., W = ww H ) as
where
The problem formulated in (5) can be proved to be a convex optimization problem. First, the objective function in (5) is the sum of concave function. 4 Hence, the objective function is a concave function. In addition, all the constraints in (5) are linear and thus are convex constraints [23] , [24] . Therefore, (5) is a convex optimization problem. Note that we have relaxed rank-one constraints on W and Q in (4) and (5), respectively. To that end, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The optimal solutions to (4) and (5), i.e., W * and Q * , respectively, are rank-one matrices.
Proof: See Appendix A. Since (5) is a convex optimization problem, it can be efficiently solved by using interior-point methods to obtain the global optimal solution [23] . Having the rank-one optimal solution W * , the optimal energy beamforming vector w * is obtained as the product of the eigenvector and eigenvalue of W * .
Although there are existing optimization packages, e.g., CVX, to solve convex optimization problem (5), it is desirable to develop an independent algorithm that can be deployed on the sensor nodes. To that end, we derive an optimal closedform solution for (4) to reduce the computation complexity of global optimal solution in the following.
B. Closed-Form Solution
In this section, we propose a new optimal closed-form solution to the problem in (5). We first derive the closed-form solution to θ k , ∀k, which is written as a function with respect to θ 0 for a given Q. Then, the optimal solutions to Q and θ 0 are derived. To proceed, we consider the Lagrange dual function for a given Q, as follows:
where ν is the non-negative Lagrange dual multipliers associated with constraints (5a). Thus, its associated dual problem is given as
where S is the feasible set of any θ k , ∀k, and has been shown in the constraints (5a) and (5b). Note that the problem (5) is convex and satisfies Slater's condition, due to the fact that θ k ∈ S, θ k > 0, for any k, with k=1 θ k < 1. Thus, the strong duality holds such that the global optimal solution for (5) satisfies the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, which is given by
From (8a), it is verified that ν * > 0 since K k=0 θ * k = 1 always holds for the problem (5). Thus, according to (8b), we consider the first-order derivative of (6) in terms of θ k and set it to zero, as follows:
From (9), it is easily verified that f (y) = log(1
is a monotonically increasing function with respect to y. Thus, in order to satisfy the above K equations in (9), we have the following equations:
Let
Substitute the above equality into the constraint (5a)
From (11) and (12), the optimal solution to θ k is derived as a function with respect to θ 0 for a given Q, as follows:
Substitute (13) into (5), we have the following problem:
The problem (14) can be equivalently written as
In order to solve (15), we temporarily fix θ 0 and find the optimal solution Q * by solving the following optimization problem:
To that end, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 2:
The optimal solution to (16) is given by
Proof: Please refer to [4] . Given Q * and exploiting Lemma 2, (15) can be rewritten with respect to θ 0 as follows:
Although the optimal energy time allocation θ * 0 can be attained by using 1-D line search, e.g., golden search, we propose a closed-form solution to achieve θ * 0 without using such an exhaustive search.
Lemma 3: The optimal energy time allocation θ * 0 can be obtained by
where W(x) is the Lambert W function.
Proof: See Appendix B. The proposed closed-form solution to problem (5) is summarized in Algorithm 1.
IV. ENERGY TRADING OR SOCIAL WELFARE-BASED SUM THROUGHPUT OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we consider a more practical scenario that the PS and the sensor network belong to different service operators. Specifically, monetary payments are required by the sensor network to purchase the energy services released from the PS to support WIT. In the following, we first introduce a quadratic energy trading process, which formulates this case as a Stackelberg game. Then linear energy tradingbased Stackelberg game is studied to provide a comparison. In addition, we formulate a social welfare scheme to capture the "cooperative" energy interaction between the PS and the sensor network. For the formulated Stackelberg games, we analyze the associated Stackelberg equilibrium, where both WET network and sensor network reach an agreement on power allocation and energy price to achieve the maximum sum throughput of the sensor network. While, the social welfare scheme aims to obtain the optimal power allocation to maximize the sum throughput.
A. Quadratic Energy Trading-Based Stackelberg Game
In this scheme, there is no cooperation between the PS and the sensor network. Instead, the sensor network purchases energy services from the PS. quadratic energy trading is introduced to exploit the strategic behaviors of these two networks and then the energy interaction is formulated as a Stackelberg game.
1) Stackelberg Game Formulation: The quadratic energy trading based Stackelberg game can be described as follows: 1) Leader: The sensor network plays the leader role and announces/pays a price for the energy services provided by the PS. The leader maximizes its utility function defined as the difference between the benefits obtained from the achievable sum throughput and the payment for the energy services. Thus, the leader-level problem can be formulated as
where μ > 0 is the price per unit sum throughput of the sensor network; τ denotes the energy price paid by the sensor network. 2) Follower: The PS is the follower and optimizes its transmit power based on the energy price announced by the leader. Specially, the follower maximizes its own utility function defined as the difference between the energy payment and its quadratic operation cost
where F(x) = Ax 2 + Bx (A and B are predetermined parameters) is a quadratic function, 5 which is employed to model the cost of the PS per unit time for wirelessly charging the sensor nodes with the transmit power P B .
In the sequel, we analyze the optimal strategies for both PS and sensor network to derive the Stackelberg equilibrium of the formulated game in order to maximize their own utility functions.
2) Stackelberg Equilibrium: In this section, we derive the Stackelberg equilibrium for the formulated game in Section IV-A1, which can be formally defined as follows.
Definition 1: Let (θ * 0 , τ * ) denote the solutions to the problem (19), while P * BS represents the solution to the problem (20) . The tuple (P * B , θ * , λ * ) is the Stackelberg equilibrium of the formulated game provided that the following conditions are satisfied:
for 0 < θ 0 < 1, τ ≥ 0, and P B ≥ 0. According to Definition 1, we first derive the closedform optimal power allocation P B by solving the follower game (20) . Given θ * 0 and τ * announced by the leader game (19) , (20) is a convex optimization problem since its objective function is a quadratic function in terms of P B with a linear constraint. Hence, the optimal solution P * B can be given in the following lemma.
Lemma 4: The optimal solution to the problem (20) is
Proof: The proof of this lemma can be derived by taking into consideration that the first derivatives to the objective function in (20) equals to zero. However, it is omitted here due to space limitation.
With a given optimal transmit power P * B of the PS, the leader problem (19) can be rewritten as
From (24), it is hard to find the optimal solutions of τ and θ 0 at the same time due to the complexity of its objective function. In order to circumvent this issue, we propose a twostep approach to solve (24) . We first derive the optimal closedform solution to τ for a given θ 0 . Then, the optimal value for θ 0 can be achieved via a numerical search. First, we derive the optimal solution for τ by introducing the following lemma.
Lemma 5: The optimal solution τ * can be derived as
/2A), and D = (B/4A).
Proof: See Appendix C. Next, substituting τ * into (24), we have the following optimization problem with respect to θ 0 :
It is easily verified that (26) is a convex optimization problem, however, it is hard to find the closed-form optimal solution for θ 0 . Thus, the optimal solution for θ 0 can be efficiently achieved via numerical search, which can be given by
The Stackelberg equilibrium for the formulated game, i.e., P * B , τ * , and θ * 0 , can be obtained via (23), (25), and (27).
B. Linear Energy Trading-Based Stackelberg Game
In the previous section, we exploit the quadratic energy trading between the PS and the sensor nodes, where the quadratic energy trading-based Stackelberg is proposed. As a comparison, in this section, we propose linear energy trading-based Stackelberg game to exploit the energy interaction between the PS and the sensor nodes with a fixed energy transfer time allocation θ 0 . In this formulated game, the PS is modeled as the leader determining the energy price to maximize its own utility, which is defined as the difference between the payment from the WSNs and the linear energy transfer cost. Thus, the utility function of the hybrid BS can be written as
where τ denotes the energy price released from the PS and κ captures the operational cost per unit transmit power. Note that κ satisfies κ ≤ τ to guarantee the utility function (28) is non-negative, whereas if κ ≥ τ , which means that the PS would refuse to sell the energy. Remark 1: From (28), one can observe that the PS's utility function is a linear function with respect to κ, which is the linear energy operation cost per unit transmit power. However, (28) is a concave function in terms of τ , which is shown in the following.
1) Stackelberg Game Leader Level:
Now, we formulate the leader game as
In addition, the sensor nodes play the follower's role to guarantee that they can harvest sufficient energy to transmit the monitoring data to the FC. Specifically, these nodes aim to maximize their own utility function defined as the gap between the benefits of the achievable sum throughput and their total payments to the PS for WET.
2) Stackelberg Game Follower Level:
The follower game is given by
Then, we focus on the optimal solution of the PS's transmit power by solving the problem (30). It is easily verified that the utility function in (31) is a concave function with respect to P BS . Now, we set its first-order derivative equal to zero
After some mathematical manipulations, the optimal power allocation of the PS with respect to λ is given by
Substituting (32) into (29) yields
Taking the first-order derivative to (33) and setting it to zero, we obtain
By solving (34), the optimal energy transfer price τ * is given by
Thus, the optimal power allocation of the PS can be achieved by substituting (35) into (32) as
Note that both U E and U L are concave functions in terms of τ and P B for a fixed θ 0 . Thus, we have completed the derivations of the Stackelberg equilibrium (τ * , P * B ) for the formulated Stackelberg game shown in (35) and (36).
C. Social Welfare Scheme
In Sections IV-A and IV-B, quadratic energy trading and linear energy trading-based Stackelberg games are formulated to exploit the hierarchical energy interaction between the PS and the sensor network. However, these two gamebased schemes may lead to the performance loss of both PS and the sensor network due to the possible selfish behaviors of these players. In order to circumvent this issue, we propose in the following a social welfare scheme, where cooperation between the WET and sensor network is allowed. This scheme does not consider the energy price. Instead, the PS and the sensor network cooperatively maximize a social welfare, which is defined as the difference between the benefits obtained from the sum throughput at the sensor network and the quadratic energy transfer operation cost of the PS. This social welfare maximization is performed by jointly optimizing the energy transfer time allocation and the transmit power of the PS. Mathematically, the social welfare utility function can be formulated as
Thus, the social welfare maximization problem is given by
It is easily verified that (38) is a convex optimization problem due to the concave function (37) and the linear constraints. Hence, we first take the first-order derivative of (37) with respect to P B for a given θ 0 , and set it to zero as follows:
where a and b have been defined in (25) . After some mathematical manipulations, we have
Then, we substitute the optimal solution P * B (40) into (38), the optimal energy time allocation θ * 0 can be achieved via numerical search similar to (27) .
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, simulation results are provided to validate our theoretical derivations in Sections III and IV. In simulation, we consider a WPSN that consists of one PS equipped with four transmit antennas, i.e., N T = 4, four single-antenna sensor nodes, i.e., K = 4, and a single-antenna FC. It is assumed that the channel coefficient g k between the PS and U k is modeled as |g k | 2 = A(d k DL ) −α g, where A = 10 −3 , α = 3 is the path loss exponent, d k DL denotes the distance between the PS and U k , and g ∼ CN (0, I) . Similarly the channel coefficient between U k and the FC, i.e., h k , is modeled as 
, and the total distance between the PS and the FC is set to be
The maximum transmit power P B is set to be 1 W, i.e., 30 dBm, unless otherwise stated. The noise power is assumed to be σ 2 = 10 −8 W, and the EH efficiency is assumed to be ξ k = ξ = 0.5 at U k , ∀k.
A. Sum Throughput Optimization
First, we evaluate the performance of the joint-optimization approach, where both PS and sensor network belong to the same service operator. Fig. 2 shows the sum throughput, obtained by exhaustive/numerical search, versus the energy time allocation θ 0 . From this result, one can observe that the sum throughput function is a concave function. As comparison, both global optimal solution and closed-form solution are presented. Optimization package CVX [26] is utilized to solve problem (5) while Algorithm 1 is executed to obtain the closed-form solution. It is clear that both solutions yield identical results which validates the accuracy of the proposed closed-form solution.
In Fig. 3 , the sum throughputs obtained by our proposed approaches, the fixed energy time allocation scheme (i.e., θ 0 = 0.5) as well as the equal time allocation (ETA) scheme in [12] are shown versus the PS's transmit power P B . It is clear that the sum throughput increases as either P B or N T or K increases. The results again confirm that the proposed closedform solution attains the same performance as the proposed global optimal solution does. It can be observed that both of our proposed solutions outperform the scheme with θ 0 = 0.5 and the ETA scheme.
Then, we evaluate the impact of the sensor deployment to the sum throughput. In Fig. 4 , the sum throughput is plotted versus the distance between the PS and a sensor, i.e., d DL with different total distances between the PS and the FC, i.e., d = 10 and 15 m. It can be seen from the figure that at a given d DL , the sum throughput decreases as d increases. This is due to a fact that the channel path loss between the sensors and the FC increases. When the distance between the PS and the FC is 10 m, deploying sensors closer to the FC results in a higher sum throughput. However, when the distance between the PS and the FC is 15 m, sensors should be placed nearer to the PS in order to obtain a higher throughput.
B. Energy Interaction Approaches
Next, we evaluate the performance of the energy-interaction approach, where both PS and sensor network belong to different service operators. In Fig. 5 , the utility functions of the sensor network for both quadratic energy trading-based Stackelberg game and social welfare scheme are plotted versus the energy time allocation θ 0 . From the figure, one can easily observe that utility functions are concave functions in terms of θ 0 . To compare, a numerical/exhaustive search is performed for the utility function of the sensor network and the results are shown in the figure. It is clear that the numerical/exhaustive search obtains the optimal energy time allocation, i.e., θ * 0 . It can also be observed that the social welfare scheme outperforms the quadratic energy trading-based Stackelberg game in terms of utility function. This is due to the fact that the PS is selfless in the social welfare scheme but not in the quadratic energy trading-based Stackelberg game.
In Fig. 6 , we plot the energy price τ versus the energy time allocation θ 0 for the quadratic and linear energy tradingbased Stackelberg games. From this result, it is easily observed that the quadratic energy trading scheme decreases as θ 0 in terms of the energy price paid by the WSN. This is owing to a fact that a larger θ 0 leads to the lower prices to be paid by the WSN. Whereas the energy transfer price is a constant in the linear energy trading, which confirms that (35). In addition, the WSN pays a higher price when employing quadratic energy trading scheme than employing linear energy trading in low energy time allocation regimes. However, the quadratic energy trading shows its financial advantage over the linear energy trading after θ 0 ≈ 0.1, since the former pays lower energy price than the latter. Fig. 7 evaluates the power consumption of the PS versus the energy time allocation θ 0 in the three proposed schemes. From this result, one can observe that the three schemes decrease with θ 0 in terms of power consumption. This is owing to a fact that a larger θ 0 allocated for WET phase will lead to a smaller power consumption. In addition, it is interesting that both quadratic energy trading-based Stackelberg game and social welfare scheme consume less power than the linear energy trading-based Stackelberg game in the low energy time regime. However, this trend will be reversed as θ 0 increases in the high energy time regime.
Then, we evaluate the utility function of these three schemes. Fig. 8 shows that the utility function versus the distance between the PS and the sensor nodes d DL . From this result, the utility functions of the sensor network for the quadratic energy trading-based Stackelberg game, the social welfare scheme, and the linear energy trading-based Stackelberg game are plotted versus the distance between the PS and the sensors, i.e., d DL , with total distance between the PS and the FC, i.e., d = 10 m. It can be seen from the figure that at a given d DL , the utility function decreases first and then increases after d DL ≈ 3 m. This means that we deploy the sensors closer to the FC results to achieve a higher utility. It also can be observed that both quadratic energy trading-based Stackelberg game and social welfare scheme outperforms the linear energy trading-based Stackelberg game, which highlight our proposed quadratic energy trading interaction between the WET and the sensor network.
In Fig. 9 , we evaluate the utility function versus the EH efficiency ξ , where the utility of these three schemes increases as ξ increases. While Fig. 10 shows that the utility function with different number of sensors K, where it confirms that a larger number of sensor nodes K will lead to the increasing of utility for these three schemes. From Figs. 9 and 10, we also observe that both quadratic energy trading-based game and social welfare scheme perform better than the linear energy trading-based game. This is because, the quadratic energy trading process outperforms the linear energy trading process, which confirms the advantage of our proposed quadratic energy trading interaction.
Finally, we compare the proposed cooperative sum throughput scheme 6 and the proposed energy interaction schemes. 7 Fig. 11 shows that the sum throughput performance versus the distance between the PS and the sensor nodes d DL . It can be observed that the cooperative sum throughput scheme outperforms these three energy interaction schemes in terms of the sum throughput. This is owing to a fact that there is a cooperation between both WET and sensor networks such that the cooperative sum throughput scheme does not need to make payment for the energy transfer. Meanwhile, both WET and sensor networks operate in a competitive manner in the proposed energy interaction schemes, in which the incentives are required by the PS for the energy service to assist the WIT in the sensor network, leading to the energy trading payment. This comparison confirms the advantage of the cooperative sum throughput scheme. In addition, the fixed time allocation scheme (i.e., θ 0 = 0.5) outperforms the linear energy trading-based Stackelberg game in terms of the sum throughput. Fig. 12 shows that the sum throughput performance versus the number of sensor nodes (i.e., K). From this result, one can observe that the cooperative sum throughput scheme outperforms the energy interaction schemes when K ≤ 7. After that the cooperative sum throughput scheme still increases slowly but it falls below the sum throughput in the energy interaction schemes. However, the sum throughput in the quadratic energy trading-based Stackelberg game decreases after K = 8 and becomes lower than the cooperative scheme again when K = 10. Additionally, the fixed time allocation scheme (i.e., θ 0 = 0.5) outperforms the linear energy trading-based Stackelberg game, which highlights the advantage of the cooperative sum throughput scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated a WPSN in IoT system, where a PS provides power wirelessly to multiple sensor nodes which send their monitor data to the FC. We first considered an ideal scenario where the PS and sensor network belong to the same service provider. In this case, we maximized the system sum throughput to jointly optimize the energy beamforming vector and time allocation. Then, for the second scenario where the PS and the sensor network belong to the different providers, we formulated quadratic energy trading and linear energy trading-based Stackelberg games as well as the social welfare scheme. A higher utility level is achieved if social welfare responsibility is taken into account as all parties work together to maximize a common target. At the same time, the energy buyer, i.e., the sensor network, would have to pay a higher price for energy purchase if the seller, i.e., the PS, has a monopoly authority to dictate and lead the market, as shown in the non-energy trading scenario. However, in an environment where there are potential competitors for energy selling, the sensor customer can become the leader who would negotiate for a much better energy price, as reflected in the energy trading case of our proposed game. Numerical results were provided to validate our proposed schemes and showed that both energy trading and social welfare schemes provide a better energy cost efficiency. For future works, we can consider a more challenging scenario such that each sensor node works in the FD mode. Specifically, the FD operation of the sensor nodes enables the simultaneous transmission/reception of information signals/energy in the DL and UL, respectively. In addition, the sensor nodes can employ the harvested energy to transmit a series of information data to the FC during multiple time periods, which leads to the energy and data queues at each sensor node. These would change the dynamic of the optimization problems, which may require different design/solutions.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Provided that the optimal energy time allocation to (5) exists, and for given θ , we consider the following problem:
The objective function in (41) is concave but nonlinear. In order to linearize this objective function, we consider the successive convex approximation to convert (41) into a series of linear programming as follows:
where Q (n) is the optimal solution at nth iteration. According to [27] , it is clear that Q (n+1) can be achieved by solving (42) and yields a rank-one solution.
Sine Q * is a rank-one matrix and Q = θ 0 W, W * is also a rank-one matrix.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Define c = P B λ max (GG H ), we write the sum throughput
We take the first-order derivatives of T(θ 0 ) with respect to θ 0 , and set ( 
Equation (46) 
After some mathematical manipulations, the optimal energy time allocation θ * 0 can be given by 
We have completed Lemma 3.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 5
It is easily verified that the objective function in (24) is a concave function in terms of τ for a given θ . Thus, in order to find the optimal solution to τ , we consider its first-order derivatives that equals to zero as Now, let us verify the validity of both solutions shown in (51). The objective function (24) includes the logarithm term, which should be non-negative. Thus, we check the validity of these solutions by substituting τ 1 and τ 2 into the logarithm term of (24), respectively. We first check τ 1 as follows:
Similarly, we check τ 2 as
Thus, τ 1 is a valid stationary point. Due to the concavity of the objective function in (24) , its second-order derivatives with respect to τ is less than zero, which indicates that its maximum value is the stationary point τ 1 . Also, it is easily verified that τ 1 > 0, which satisfies the constraint in (24) . Thus, the optimal solution to the problem (24), denoted by τ * , is the stationary point τ 1 , which completes the proof.
